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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
BECKER, Chief Judge. 
 
After the Government of the Virgin Islands had brought 
criminal charges in the Territorial Court of the Virgin 
Islands against Leroy Richards for sexual misconduct, the 
Attorney General attempted to exercise the traditional 
common law power of nolle prosequi and moved to dismiss. 
However, the Territorial Court, suspicious of the 
Government's motives, resisted and scheduled a hearing to 
explore further the underlying facts. Before that hearing 
could be held, but after the submission of an affidavit from 
the original complainant indicating her desire to terminate 
the matter, Richards sought a writ of mandamus from the 
Appellate Division of the District Court of the Virgin 
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Islands, seeking to compel the Territorial Court to dismiss 
the charges against Richards. The District Court granted 
the writ, concluding that the local court rule under which 
the Territorial Court pursued the hearing violated the 
Revised Organic Act ("ROA"), 48 U.S.C. S 1541 et seq., 
because it trammeled upon the prosecutor's substantive 
authority under local law. The court reasoned that the ROA 
did not accord local courts the authority to promulgate 
such substantive laws, rendering the local rule used to 
justify the Territorial Court's conduct null and void. This 
appeal followed. 
 
The appeal presents several important questions of 
judicial governance in the Virgin Islands. First, does the 
District Court have mandamus jurisdiction over the 
Territorial Court? We conclude that it does. The local 
legislature, acting under the authority granted it by the 
ROA, has extended appellate jurisdiction to the District 
Court over criminal matters other than those resolved by 
guilty plea. The jurisprudence is clear that jurisdiction to 
issue writs of mandamus lies in cases where potential 
jurisdiction exists, as it does here. Moreover, both local 
statute, see 4 V.I.C. S 34, and the All Writs Act, 48 U.S.C. 
S 1651, give the District Court the authority to issue writs 
of mandamus. We further conclude that the ROA's 
command that the relationship between the District Court 
and local courts mirror the one between state and federal 
courts is not a bar to the District Court's exercise of 
mandamus power because the District Court retains 
appellate jurisdiction over the Territorial Court of the Virgin 
Islands. 
 
Having cleared the jurisdictional hurdle, Richards next 
faces the challenge of establishing that the Territorial Court 
exceeded its authority in scheduling a hearing on the 
matter of Richards's prosecution rather than promptly 
dismissing it as requested by the parties. We conclude that 
Richards has not met this burden. The Territorial Court 
offers two procedural rules to justify its conduct. The first 
justification, reliance on Local Rule 128(b), which precludes 
dismissal of criminal cases absent a judicial finding that 
the dismissal is in good faith, in the public interest, and in 
the interests of justice, fails because the rule explicitly 
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allows the local court to substitute its judgment for that of 
local prosecutors in deciding which cases should be 
prosecuted. Because this judgment is reserved to 
prosecutors under the old common law power of nolle 
prosequi, Rule 128(b) is a substantive rule of law rather 
than a procedural rule that the local court is authorized to 
promulgate under the ROA. While the Virgin Islands 
legislature may enact such a rule, the local court may not, 
making Rule 128(b) a violation of the separation of powers 
among the three branches of government of the Virgin 
Islands as delineated by Congress. 
 
The local rules of the Territorial Court apply the Federal 
Rules in circumstances in which there are no valid rules to 
the contrary, and hence the Territorial Court's actions may 
possibly be justified by Fed. R. Crim. P. 48(a), which 
provides that prosecutions shall only be dismissed by leave 
of the court. In light of the traditional common law power 
of nolle prosequi that allowed prosecutors total discretion in 
determining which cases to pursue, the argument that this 
rule also has a substantive component is not without force. 
We believe, however, that though Rule 48(a) does not confer 
unfettered discretion upon courts to resist motions to 
dismiss, it does have a procedural component that allows 
inquiry into the circumstances surrounding a dismissal in 
a manner that does not sufficiently intrude upon the 
prosecutorial domain to be viewed as a substantive rule. 
 
In this case, the Territorial Court did not deny the motion 
to dismiss but merely scheduled a hearing. In light of a 
court's ability to use Rule 48(a) to let "sunshine" into areas 
where local authorities may be suspected of inappropriate 
dealings, we are not persuaded that the Territorial Court 
behaved in a manner that required the extraordinary 
remedy of mandamus. Accordingly, we will vacate the order 
of the District Court with directions to remand the matter 
to the Territorial Court. We do not do so, however, to give 
that court carte blanche over prosecutorial decisions. The 
Territorial Court may conduct a hearing on the 
circumstances surrounding the Government's requested 
dismissal before it surrenders jurisdiction, but it lacks the 
power to compel the Government to take further steps to 
prosecute Richards. 
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I. 
 
In October 1995, Richards was charged by information 
with the felony of second degree rape under 14 V.I.C. 
S 1702. In April 1997, the Government amended the 
information to include the misdemeanor of unlawful sexual 
contact under 14 V.I.C. S 1709. On April 29, 1997, the 
parties entered into a plea agreement pursuant to which 
Richards would plead to the misdemeanor in return for 
dismissal of the felony charges. The agreement was 
presented to Judge Ive Swan of the Territorial Court, but, 
based on the seriousness of the conduct initially alleged, he 
rejected it and set the case for jury selection on June 2. 
 
On May 21, the Government filed a new complaint, 
arising out of the same incident, that contained only the 
misdemeanor charge. At arraignment on the new complaint, 
Richards attempted to enter a plea of guilty. The presiding 
judge, Territorial Court Judge Brenda Hollar, became aware 
of the parallel case pending before Judge Swan. Displeased 
with what she perceived to be judge shopping, she referred 
the matter to Judge Swan. On the same day, the 
Government filed a motion requesting that Judge Swan 
dismiss the original charges because the Government 
lacked the ability to prove all the elements beyond a 
reasonable doubt. Several weeks later, the Government 
moved to dismiss the newer (misdemeanor only) charge as 
well. 
 
On June 12, Judge Swan held a hearing at which the 
prosecutor requested that the charges be dropped in the 
"interests of justice." Judge Swan refused to do so without 
first examining the purported victim and prosecutors, 
though he indicated that if the victim made clear that she 
did not want the case to proceed and was aware of the 
Government's plans to drop the case, he would end the 
matter. He also expressed concern with the seriousness of 
the crime charged and about what he perceived to be the 
Government's attempt to circumvent his refusal to accept 
the earlier plea agreement. Judge Swan scheduled a 
hearing for July 17. On June 18, the Government and 
Richards filed a joint motion to dismiss that reiterated the 
prosecutor's conclusion that the case lacked merit. The 
motion was accompanied by supporting affidavits from the 
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purported victim and her mother that made clear that they 
did not wish the case to be prosecuted and that the 
purported victim would not testify against Richards. 
 
On July 2, Richards moved to stay the July 17 hearing 
and to dismiss the case. He also claimed that the original 
facts, as alleged, had been determined to be false. The 
Government's response, filed on July 14, concurred with 
Richards's motion and urged the court to not require the 
purported victim and her mother to face the burden of 
having to appear in court. 
 
On July 15, 1997, the Territorial Court promulgated a 
new local rule that amended Local Rule 128 to include new 
subsections (b) and (c). These amendments empowered the 
Territorial Court to refuse to dismiss cases unless the local 
court determined that the dismissal is "in good faith, in the 
public interest, and in the interest of justice." Also on July 
15, Richards filed a petition in the District Court of the 
Virgin Islands for a writ of mandamus and for a stay of the 
July 17 hearing. The District Court granted the stay the 
next day. 
 
On March 19, 1998, the Appellate Division of the District 
Court heard argument. Eleven months later, the court 
granted the writ and ordered the counts against Richards 
dismissed. It also declared the new Territorial Court Rule 
128(b) to be null and void, holding that the Territorial Court 
had exceeded its rulemaking authority when it promulgated 
Rule 128(b). The Court concluded that the executive branch 
in the Virgin Islands has exclusive control of the 
prosecutorial function and that by transferring discretion 
over the termination of prosecutions to the local court, Rule 
128(b) was a substantive rule that was disallowed by the 
ROA, which allows local courts to promulgate only 
procedural rules. The District Court also rejected the 
alternative argument that the refusal to dismiss could be 
justified by Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 48(a), 
applied under Territorial Court Rule 7, which invokes the 
federal rules of procedure in the absence of local rules to 
the contrary. The court concluded that the Territorial 
Court's application of Rule 48(a) would have similarly been 
in excess of its rulemaking power. Having determined that 
Judge Swan's conduct overstepped his authority, the 
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District Court ruled that Richards had met the other 
conditions for receiving the extraordinary remedy of 
mandamus and issued the writ. This appeal followed. 
 
Our jurisdiction is based on 28 U.S.C. S 1291. We 
discuss the District Court's jurisdiction to issue the 
mandamus petition below. Our review of the jurisdictional 
matters raised by this case is plenary. See Anthuis v. Colt 
Indus. Operating Corp., 971 F.2d 999, 1002 (3d Cir. 1992). 
We review the discretionary elements of the District Court's 
grant of a writ of mandamus for abuse of discretion; our 
review over the non-discretionary elements of the grant is 
plenary. See Stehney v. Perry, 101 F.3d 925, 929 (3d Cir. 
1996). 
 
II. 
 
Determining whether the Appellate Division of the 
District Court possessed the jurisdiction to issue the writ in 
the first instance requires three levels of analysis. We must 
first consider whether the District Court has the requisite 
jurisdiction over the Territorial Court to sustain the 
exercise of mandamus power. If so, we need to decide 
whether it possesses the statutory authority to issue writs 
of mandamus. Finally, we must determine whether the 
issuance of a writ of mandamus comports with the ROA's 
dictate that the relations between the District Court and 
the Territorial Court reflect those between federal and state 
courts. 
 
A. 
 
Courts established by the Congress have authority to 
issue "all writs necessary or appropriate in aid of their 
respective jurisdictions and agreeable to the usages and 
principles of law." 28 U.S.C. S 1651. Thefirst question 
before us is whether the District Court has any jurisdiction 
in aid of which it could have issued a writ of mandamus 
upon the Territorial Court. Untangling the issue requires 
that we examine the ROA, which governs the territory's 
court structure. See 48 U.S.C. S 1541 et seq. We have 
elucidated the architecture of the ROA elsewhere, see Brow 
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v. Farrelly, 994 F.2d 1027 (3d Cir. 1993), and need not 
rescribe that discussion save for a brief summary. 
 
The ROA extends appellate jurisdiction over local courts 
to the Appellate Division of the District Court to the extent 
allowed by local law (subject to the proviso that the 
legislature may not preclude District Court review of federal 
matters). See 48 U.S.C. S 1613a(a). The Appellate Division 
is generally composed of the two judges of the District 
Court plus a third judge sitting by designation, who usually 
comes from the Territorial Court. See 48 U.S.C. SS 1613a, 
1614. Though the local legislature has the right to establish 
a territorial appellate court, it has thus far not elected to do 
so. In criminal matters, the Virgin Islands legislature has 
extended appellate jurisdiction to the District Court in 
"cases in which the defendant has been convicted, other 
than on a plea of guilty." 4 V.I.C. S 33. 
 
The Territorial Court, appearing here through Judge 
Swan and represented by the Court's General Counsel, 
contends that the District Court lacked subject matter 
jurisdiction to issue the writ. More specifically, because 
Richards was never convicted, it maintains that the District 
Court lacked potential jurisdiction and, consequently, the 
ability to issue a writ in aid of non-existent jurisdiction. We 
disagree. Appellate courts have the power to issue writs of 
mandamus prior to the filing of appealable orders when the 
conditions requiring the writ exist. Cf. Helstoski v. Meanor, 
442 U.S. 500, 506-08 (1979) (mandamus does not lie when 
direct appeal is available); Pennsylvania v. Newcomer, 618 
F.2d 246, 249 (3d Cir. 1980) (declaring mandamus should 
be avoided when appeal is available through collateral order 
doctrine). Indeed, the mandamus power would mean little if 
it could not be invoked until the filing of an appealable 
order. Were that so, litigants would rely exclusively on the 
right to appeal, and mandamus power would be 
superfluous. More specifically, jurisdiction to issue writs of 
mandamus under 28 U.S.C. S 1651 lies in cases in which 
potential appellate jurisdiction exists. See, e.g., In re 
Chambers Dev. Co., 148 F.3d 214, 223 n.6 (3d Cir. 1998) 
("Under the All Writs Act, the writ of mandamus can be 
issued where `necessary or appropriate in aid of[the 
court's] jurisdiction.' 28 U.S.C. S 1651(a). However, to 
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satisfy the jurisdictional prerequisite, it is not necessary 
that the action in which the writ is sought be pending in 
the court asked to issue the writ. Rather, it is only required 
that the case may at some future time come within the 
court's appellate jurisdiction.") (citation omitted); 
Hahnemann v. Univ. Hosp., 74 F.3d 456, 460 (3d Cir. 
1996); Glenmede Trust Co. v. Thompson, 56 F.3d 476, 482 
(3d Cir. 1995). 
 
Though mandamus is usually difficult to obtain, courts 
sitting in their appellate capacity have heard mandamus 
petitions filed by defendants over pretrial criminal 
proceedings. See, e.g., Hilbert v. Dooling, 476 F.2d 355, 362 
(2d Cir. 1973) (en banc) (employing mandamus to compel 
district court to dismiss indictment); 16 Wright, Miller, & 
Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure S 3936.1 (2d ed. 
1996) (collecting cases). Once jurisdiction is established, 
the ability to issue writs in aid of potential appellate 
jurisdiction sweeps broadly. "The power to issue such writs 
in aid of our potential appellate jurisdiction comprehends 
our responsibility for the orderly and efficient 
administration of justice within the circuit." New York v. 
U.S. Metals Ref. Co., 771 F.2d 796, 801 (3d Cir. 1985) 
(quoting Rodgers v. U.S. Steel Corp., 508 F.2d 152, 161 (3d 
Cir. 1975)). 
 
The Territorial Court suggests that such authority should 
be curtailed in this case, given the District Court's inability 
to prescribe rules of practice and procedure for the 
Territorial Court and its inability to regulate the admission 
of attorneys to the Virgin Islands bar. As important as these 
functions are, we do not consider them as relevant to the 
question at hand as the District Court's main role with 
respect to the Territorial Court, that of hearing appeals. It 
is this authority that gives rise to the mandamus power, 
not the authority referred to by the Territorial Court. 
 
In sum, the District Court had potential appellate 
jurisdiction over the case as Richards could have gone to 
trial and been convicted. The Territorial Court points to no 
cases that distinguish the current facts from the general 
rule that potential appellate jurisdiction is sufficient for the 
exercise of mandamus power. 
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B. 
 
The next question is whether the District Court, as a 
non-Article III court, had the statutory authority necessary 
to issue a writ of mandamus in light of the structure 
established by the Revised Organic Act. The issue seems 
quite straightforward insofar as the Virgin Islands 
legislature plainly intended to extend all writs power to the 
District Court. See 4 V.I.C. S 34 ("The district court may 
from time to time prescribe rules, consistent with law and 
with the rules adopted by the Supreme Court, for the 
conduct of its business and may issue writs of habeas 
corpus, review and prohibition and all other writs and make 
mandatory orders and all other orders necessary or 
appropriate in aid of its original or appellate jurisdiction and 
agreeable to the usages and principles of law.") (emphasis 
added). Moreover, we have previously assumed that 
mandamus authority properly lies with the District Court of 
the Virgin Islands, see Brow v. Farrelly, 994 F.2d 1027, 
1036 n.9 (3d Cir. 1993), and the District Court has so 
exercised it, see Dawsey v. Gov't of the Virgin Islands, 931 
F. Supp. 397 (V.I. App. Div.), aff 'd 106 F.3d 384 (3d Cir. 
1996). 
 
The Territorial Court contends, however, that the Virgin 
Islands legislature lacked the authority to extend all writs 
power to the District Court. This argument is based on the 
fact that the ROA only permits the legislature to prescribe 
the District Court's appellate jurisdiction. See 48 U.S.C. 
S 1613a. The Territorial Court maintains that this limitation 
is fatal to the exercise of mandamus power because 
appellate jurisdiction is not inclusive of mandamus power. 
For support of this proposition, it points to Congress's 
making separate provisions for all writs jurisdiction and the 
appellate power when it established the authority of the 
federal courts of appeals. Compare 28 U.S.C.SS 1291, 1292 
(delineating appellate jurisdiction of courts of appeals), with 
28 U.S.C. S 1651 (delineating all writs power of federal 
courts). 
 
The thrust of the Territorial Court's objection, that all 
writs power in aid of the appellate power is not 
synonymous with the appellate power and therefore 
requires an independent statutory basis, carries surface 
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appeal. We note in this regard that we have been reluctant 
to recognize extensions to the District Court by the Virgin 
Islands legislature of powers not explicitly permitted by the 
ROA. See Moravian Sch. Advisory Bd. of St. Thomas v. 
Rawlins, 70 F.3d 270 (3d Cir. 1995) (holding, in light of 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure that required dismissal and 
absence of authority in ROA, district court lacked power to 
transfer power case improperly filed in District and not 
Territorial Court notwithstanding authorization by the 
territorial legislature). We need not, however, grapple with 
this issue. Whether appellate power inherently includes 
mandamus power, is irrelevant to the outcome, for 
Congress has granted all writs authority to all  courts 
"established by Act of Congress." The law makes no 
distinction between Article III courts and those with 
jurisdiction over territories that are established pursuant to 
Congress's authority under Article IV S 3 of the 
Constitution. 
 
We discern no reason to doubt that the All Writs Act 
means what it says, and therefore applies to all courts 
established by Congress, even if they are not of the Article 
III variety. This conclusion is not mere intuition. In an 
analogous setting, the Supreme Court has declared that 
military courts have all writs power because they are courts 
created by congressional statute. See Noyd v. Bond, 395 
U.S. 683, 695 n.7 (1969).1 The same has been held of the 
Court of Veterans Appeals. See Cox v. West, 149 F.3d 1360, 
1363 (Fed. Cir. 1998) ("[T]here is no qualifying language in 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. The Court noted: 
 
       Since the All Writs Act applies by its terms to any`courts 
       established by Act of Congress,' and since the Revisers of 1948 
       expressly noted that `[t]he revised section extends the power to 
issue 
       writs in aid of jurisdiction, to all courts established by Act of 
       Congress, thus making explicit the right to exercise powers implied 
       from the creation of such courts,' we do not believe that there can 
       be any doubt as to the power of the Court of Military Appeals to 
       issue an emergency writ of habeas corpus in cases . . . which may 
       ultimately be reviewed by that court. A different question would, 
of 
       course, arise in a case which the Court of Military Appeals is not 
       authorized to review under the governing statutes. 
 
Id. 
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title 28 which limits the term `all courts established by Act 
of Congress' to Article III courts or specifically excludes the 
Court of Veterans Appeals. On the contrary, when Congress 
wishes to specify a subset of courts, it does so explicitly."). 
Similarly, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has 
recognized that the appellate division of the District Court 
of Guam has authority to issue a writ of mandamus to the 
Guam Superior Court under the All Writs Act. See Apusento 
Garden (Guam), Inc. v. Superior Court of Guam, 94 F.3d 
1346, 1349 (9th Cir. 1996) (citing Cruz v. Abbate, 812 F.2d 
571, 573 (9th Cir. 1987)). In sum, it is clear that the 
Appellate Division of the District Court of the Virgin Islands 
has the power to issue writs of mandamus when it 
possesses the requisite appellate jurisdiction. 
 
C. 
 
The final alleged barrier to the District Court's 
mandamus jurisdiction raised by the Territorial Court 
emerges from the ROA's mandate that relations between 
the District Court and the Territorial Court mirror that 
between federal and state courts. 
 
The ROA states: 
 
       The relations between the courts established by the 
       Constitution or laws of the United States and the 
       courts established by local law with respect to appeals, 
       certiorari, removal of causes, the issuance of writs of 
       habeas corpus, and other matters or proceedings shall 
       be governed by the laws of the United States pertaining 
       to the relations between the courts of the United 
       States, including the Supreme Court of the United 
       States, and the courts of the several States in such 
       matters and proceedings . . . . 
 
48 U.S.C. S 1613. 
 
The Territorial Court argues that because federal courts 
generally cannot issue mandamus orders to their state 
counterparts, see In re Grand Jury Proceedings , 654 F.2d 
268, 278 (3d Cir. 1981), the District Court could not visit 
a mandamus order upon the Territorial Court. This 
argument is unpersuasive. As explained supra in Part II.A, 
 
                                12 
  
the jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus to another 
court exists when a court has potential appellate 
jurisdiction. While in the ordinary course of events, federal 
courts (except for the Supreme Court) lack appellate 
jurisdiction over their state counterparts, thus making 
writs of mandamus generally inappropriate, the 
relationship between the District Court of the Virgin Islands 
and the Territorial Court of the Virgin Islands differs from 
that between a federal and state court in one key respect-- 
until the Virgin Islands legislature creates a local appellate 
court, the District Court has appellate jurisdiction over the 
Territorial Court. Because mandamus lies in aid of 
potential appellate jurisdiction, the District Court can issue 
a writ of mandamus to the local court notwithstanding the 
ROA's command that their relations be those of state and 
federal courts. 
 
Any lingering doubt in this regard is resolved by 
precedent from the United States Supreme Court. That 
federal court also has appellate jurisdiction over the state 
courts. Consistent with this jurisdiction, the Supreme 
Court has permitted the filing of writs of mandamus 
against state courts. See General Atomic Co. v. Felter, 436 
U.S. 493, 497 (1978) (granting leave to file writ of 
mandamus against state court). In a similar vein, the 
Supreme Court has proclaimed its ability to issue 
injunctions to stay state court proceedings in 
circumstances where lower federal courts cannot. See 
Atlantic Coast R.R. Co. v. Bhd. of Locomotive Eng'rs , 398 
U.S. 281, 296 (1970) ("Unlike the Federal District Court, 
this Court does have potential appellate jurisdiction over 
federal questions raised in state court proceedings, and 
that broader jurisdiction allows this Court correspondingly 
broader authority to issue injunctions `necessary in aid of 
its jurisdiction.' "). Under certain circumstances, the Court 
has also issued stays of state court injunctions in matters 
that could eventually reach the Supreme Court on appeal. 
See, e.g., CBS, Inc. v. Davis, 510 U.S. 1315, 1318 
(Blackmun, Circuit Justice, 1994) (declaring that stay of 
state lower court injunction is appropriate under All Writs 
Act because injunction conflicts with Court precedent, 
could warrant certiorari, and would cause irreparable harm 
if it took effect). 
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For these reasons, we are satisfied that the District Court 
had the requisite jurisdiction necessary to issue a writ of 
mandamus to the Territorial Court. We now turn to the 
question whether the writ was properly granted. 
 
III. 
 
Given their extraordinary character, writs of mandamus 
are not to be issued lightly. "[O]nly exceptional 
circumstances amounting to a judicial `usurpation of power' 
will justify the invocation of this extraordinary remedy." 
Citibank, N.A. v. Fullam, 580 F.2d 82, 86 (3d Cir. 1978) 
(quoting Will v. United States, 389 U.S. 90, 95 (1967)). "The 
traditional use of the writ in aid of appellate jurisdiction 
both at common law and in the federal courts has been to 
confine an inferior court to a lawful exercise of its 
prescribed jurisdiction or to compel it to exercise its 
authority when it is its duty to do so." Mallard v. U.S. Dist. 
Court for the S. Dist. of Iowa, 490 U.S. 296, 308 (1989) 
(quoting Roche v. Evaporated Milk Assn., 319 U.S. 21, 26 
(1943)). Therefore, only clear errors of law that"at least 
approach the magnitude of an unauthorized exercise of 
judicial power, or a failure to use that power when there is 
a duty to do so" require the writ. Lusardi v. Lechner, 855 
F.2d 1062, 1069 (3d Cir. 1988). 
 
A. 
 
The contention that the Territorial Court usurped power 
in not dismissing the charges against Richards is founded 
on the venerable common law doctrine of nolle prosequi. 
Under this doctrine, prosecutors have the power to decide 
whether to proceed with the prosecution of a charged 
defendant. Absent a controlling statute or rule to the 
contrary, this power resides solely in the prosecutor's 
hands until the impanelment and swearing of a jury. See 
21 Am. Jur. 2d S 779 (1998). This common law power of 
prosecutors had long been the rule in federal courts. For 
example, in Confiscation Cases, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 454, 457 
(1868), the Supreme Court declared: 
 
       Public prosecutions, until they come before the court to 
       which they are returnable, are within the exclusive 
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       direction of the district attorney, and even after they 
       are entered in court, they are so far under his control 
       that he may enter a nolle prosequi at any time before 
       the jury is empaneled for the trial of the case, except in 
       cases where it is otherwise provided in some act of 
       Congress. 
 
We discuss the impact the promulgation of Fed. R. Crim. P. 
48(a) has had on this principle infra in Part III.C. 
 
The Territorial Court argues that substantive common 
law does not govern the issuance of dismissals in the Virgin 
Islands. Our analysis of the Territory's laws and precedents 
persuades us otherwise. In the absence of superseding 
rules to the contrary, the common law prevails in the Virgin 
Islands. See 1 V.I.C. S 4. The common law's vesting of 
discretion in the hands of the prosecutor has been 
previously recognized in Virgin Islands jurisprudence. See 
Tonkin v. Michael, 349 F. Supp. 78 (D. V.I. 1972). Tonkin is 
also notable insofar as it rescribes a wonderful--and highly 
apposite--anecdote from the English Common Law, which 
we set forth in the margin.2 Of course, the Virgin Islands 
legislature could enact a law or rule to alter or eradicate the 
nolle prosequi power. Until it does so, however, local 
prosecutors retain the common law nolle prosequi  power. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. The Tonkin opinion recounts: 
 
       An incident related in 2 Campbell's Lives of the Chancellors 173 is 
       of interest in this connection. After he had ordered the 
       imprisonment of a group of fanatics called "Prophets" for seditious 
       language, Lord Holt was visited by Lacy, one of their friends, who 
       informed a servant that he carried a message "from the Lord God." 
       Lacy was admitted and told Lord Holt: "I come to you a prophet from 
       the Lord God, who has sent me to thee, and would have thee grant 
       a nolle prosequi for John Atkins, his servant, whom thou has cast 
       into prison." Lord Holt replied: "Thou art a false prophet, and a 
lying 
       knave. If the Lord God had sent thee it would have been to the 
       Attorney-General, for He knows that it belongeth not to the Chief 
       Justice to grant a nolle prosequi; but I, as Chief Justice, can 
grant 
       a warrant to commit thee to bear him company." 
 
Tonkin, 349 F.Supp. at 81-82 n.9 (citing Justice Traynor in People v. 
Sidener, 375 P.2d 641, 642, n.4 (Cal. 1962)). 
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The Territorial Court rejoins that Judge Swan's conduct 
was justified by Local Rule 128(b) and, alternatively, Fed. R. 
Crim. P. 48(a), which applies to the Territorial Court 
through operation of Local Rule 7. We turn first to 
consideration of Rule 128(b). 
 
B. 
 
On July 15, 1997, prior to the District Court's stay of 
Judge Swan's hearing, the Territorial Court amended local 
Rule 128 to include subsection (b), which states: 
 
       No criminal case filed in the court, including traffic 
       citations, shall be dismissed upon motion by any party 
       except upon a determination by the Court that the 
       dismissal is in good faith, in the public interest, and in 
       the interest of justice. 
 
The Territorial Court submits that Rule 128(b) justifies 
Judge Swan's conduct in not dismissing the charges and in 
scheduling the July 17 hearing. The Government responds 
that Rule 128(b) exceeds the Territorial Court's power 
under the ROA. This argument demands contemplation of 
the lines separating substance from procedure and the 
legislative from the judicial. 
 
The ROA provides that "[t]he rules governing the practice 
and procedure of the courts established by local law. . . 
shall be governed by local law or the rules promulgated by 
those courts." 48 U.S.C. S 1611(c). It is clear from this 
provision that the rules promulgated by the Territorial 
Court must be respectful of the legislature's power to enact 
substantive law. We have held that "the doctrine of 
separation of powers applies with respect to the coordinate 
branches of government in the Virgin Islands." Smith v. 
Magras, 124 F.3d 457, 465 (3d Cir. 1997). It naturally 
follows that the Territorial Court cannot exercise legislative 
powers. "[A]s a general rule inherent in the American 
constitutional system . . . unless otherwise expressly 
provided or incidental to the powers conferred . . . the 
judiciary cannot exercise either executive or legislative 
power." Id. at 465-66 (quoting Springer v. Gov't of the 
Philippine Islands, 277 U.S. 189, 201-02 (1928)). Even if it 
could, the Virgin Islands legislature has not ceded any of its 
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substantive lawmaking power to the Territorial Court.3 
Therefore the question is whether Rule 128(b) is an 
impermissible substantive rule of law or a procedural rule 
that is authorized by the Revised Organic Act. 
 
As discussed above, see supra Part III.A, at common law 
the power of prosecutors to determine whether to try a 
defendant prior to the impanelment of a jury bordered on 
the absolute. Under both statute and precedent, that would 
appear to be the rule that holds in the territory. See 1 
V.I.C. S 4 ("The rules of the common law, as expressed in 
the restatements of the law . . . and to the extent not so 
expressed, as generally understood and applied in the 
United States, shall be the rules of decision in the courts of 
the Virgin Islands in the cases to which they apply, in the 
absence of local laws to the contrary."); Tonkin v. Michael, 
349 F. Supp. 78 (D. V.I. 1972). By commanding and 
empowering a court to determine whether the dismissal of 
a prosecution would be in the public interest and the 
interest of justice, Rule 128(b) licenses the substitution of 
the Territorial Court's judgment for that of the prosecutor. 
This is not, therefore, a rule of "practice and procedure" 
within the scope of the local courts' rulemaking ability 
under the ROA, but a substantive rule of law. The ROA 
vests the authority to enact such laws in the legislature. 
While the local judiciary may certainly petition the 
legislature for expanded powers, it may not unilaterally vest 
them upon itself. 
 
To be sure, the line separating procedure from substance 
is often unclear. "The test must be whether a rule really 
regulates procedure,--the judicial process for enforcing 
rights and duties recognized by substantive law . . . ." 
Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 14 (1941). Rule 128(b), 
however, does not enforce a right or duty recognized by 
substantive law, but rather transfers discretion that was 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. The Territorial Court cites to 4 V.I.C. S 243(8), but that statute only 
grants the local courts power "[t]o amend and control its process and 
orders so as to make them conformable to law and justice." Adjusting 
process to conform with "law" gives no hint that any lawmaking 
functions have been transferred to the judicial branch, and indeed, 
suggests that they continue to reside solely with legislative authorities. 
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once wielded by the local prosecutor into judicial hands 
under novel standards promulgated in Rule 128(b) itself: 
the court must determine that dismissal "is in good faith, 
in the public interest, and in the interest of justice." In 
other words, the rule's standard of judgment does not look 
to preexisting rights and duties that Rule 128(b) may have 
been designed to enforce. Rather, it looks to the judgments 
of the same court that promulgated the rule. The Territorial 
Court thus seeks to expand its own power at the expense 
of local prosecutors. This it cannot do, and the District 
Court properly held Rule 128(b) to be void. 
 
C. 
 
Because Rule 128(b) is a nullity, Territorial Court Rule 7, 
which applies the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure to 
cases in which there is no local rule to the contrary, points 
us to Fed. R. Crim. P. 48(a). First promulgated in 1944, 
Rule 48(a) provides (with emphasis added): "The Attorney 
General or the United States attorney may by leave of court 
file a dismissal of an indictment, information or complaint 
and the prosecution shall thereupon terminate. Such a 
dismissal may not be filed during the trial without the 
consent of the defendant." 
 
Like Rule 128(b), Rule 48(a) appears to alter the 
traditional common law nolle prosequi power of executive 
authorities by requiring "leave of the court" to dismiss a 
prosecution. In contrast to Rule 128(b), and as discussed in 
further detail below, the actual standards for when a court 
may refuse a motion to dismiss under Rule 48(a) are 
unclear. In the Government of the Virgin Islands' view, 
whatever the standards are, Rule 48(a) also ventures into 
the substantive realm. The Government argues that Rule 
48(a) cannot justify the Territorial Court's failure to dismiss 
the charges against Richards for the same reasons that 
Rule 128(b) cannot: If Rule 128(b) violates the Virgin 
Islands' separation-of-powers scheme, then the same can 
also be said of the application of Rule 48(a) as a rule 
promulgated by the Territorial Court, because it too 
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eliminates the absolute discretion of prosecutors to decide 
whether or not to pursue their cases.4  
 
The Territorial Court contends that even if the common 
law practice of nolle prosequi has been the substantive 
common law of the Virgin Islands, it has been displaced by 
past practices to the contrary (as reflected by District 
Court's use of Rule 48(a) in its opinion in Dawsey v. Gov't 
of the Virgin Islands, 931 F. Supp. 397 (V.I. App. Div.), 
aff 'd 106 F.3d 384 (3d Cir. 1996)). This argument is 
unavailing, however, because if Rule 48(a) cannot be 
promulgated by a Virgin Islands court, past practices to the 
contrary are irrelevant. More importantly, whatever the 
adherence to the common law in the Virgin Islands in the 
past, local statute expressly provides that common law 
practices are to prevail in the absence of law to the 
contrary. See 1 V.I.C. S 4. 
 
Though recognizing the common law background, we 
must acknowledge the force of the argument that Rule 48(a) 
must be a procedural rule because rules promulgated 
under the aegis of the federal Rules Enabling Act ("REA") 
are to be procedural, rather than substantive, in character. 
See 28 U.S.C. S 2072 (providing that promulgated 
procedural rules "shall not abridge, enlarge or modify any 
substantive right.").5 Rule 48(a), like all federal rules of 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. The Territorial Court argues that to hold Rule 48(a) inapplicable would 
violate the Supremacy Clause. This argument is plainly mistaken. 
Congress never applied the rule to the Virgin Islands courts. Rather, the 
Territorial Court chose to adopt the federal standard and thus we 
interpret Rule 48(a) in accordance with federal precedent. Any authority 
the federal rules have over territorial courts is a function of 
territorial 
law that must be consistent with the ROA. There is no conflict with 
federal law because federal law has delegated to the territory the ability 
to determine its rules for itself. Although the Territorial Court may 
adopt 
whatever rules it chooses, those rules must still comport with the ROA. 
5. At the time Rule 48(a) was promulgated, the enabling statutory 
language was contained in 18 U.S.C. S 687 (1946) (current version at 28 
U.S.C. S 2072) and read: "The Supreme Court of the United States shall 
have the power to prescribe, from time to time, rules of pleading, 
practice, and procedure with respect to any or all proceedings prior to 
and including verdict . . . ." Though the law lacked the later caveat 
concerning the contraction or enlargement of substantive rights, its 
focus remained on enacting rules of "procedure" not substance. In this 
regard, the law resembled the relevant portions of the ROA, which only 
allows local courts to enact rules that govern "practice and procedure." 
48 U.S.C. S 1611(c). 
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procedure that have been applied by the courts since the 
passage of the REA, enjoys an arguable presumption of 
regularity as a procedural rule. Moreover, the Territorial 
Court conceded at oral argument that there is likely little a 
court can do to compel action even if it denies a Rule 48(a) 
motion. Cf. United States v. Hamm, 659 F.2d 624, 632 (5th 
Cir. Unit A Oct. 1981) (en banc). Even if we were to uphold 
the Territorial Court's failure to grant the motion to 
dismiss, therefore, that court would seem to have few 
options if the day of trial came, and the prosecution refused 
to call witnesses or otherwise go forward with its case. The 
substantive bite of the rule, therefore, appears to be 
hampered by the dullness of its teeth. 
 
Yet Rule 48(a) is commonly seen as affecting the common 
law power of prosecutors, irrespective of whether it is 
authorized solely as a procedural rule. See 1944 Advisory 
Committee Notes on Adopting Rule 48; 3A Wright, Fed. 
Practice & Procedure S 812 (2d ed. 1982). One possible 
route out of this conundrum is to argue that whatever 
substantive effect the Rule possesses emanates from 
Congress because the Rules Enabling Act contains a 
procedure through which proposed new rules are submitted 
to Congress and require at least a seven-month delay before 
they can take effect, thus providing some check on 
Congress's potential delegation of its substantive 
lawmaking authority to the judiciary. See 28 U.S.C. S 2074.6 
In contrast, no similar mechanism exists in the Virgin 
Islands. But this argument is unsatisfactory. The Rules 
Enabling Act's provision for submission to Congress does 
not give Congress any authority that it does not already 
have. Congress can always vote to abrogate a rule 
promulgated by the judiciary. Neither the delay in the rules' 
taking effect nor the submission to Congress requirement 
creates a veto by silence. Congress must affirmatively 
legislate to obviate a properly submitted rule. 
 
The upshot is that Rule 48(a) is a strange animal. It 
reads like a procedural rule, but by interposing a 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. At the time of Rule 48(a)'s promulgation, the rule was not to take 
effect until after the conclusion of the session of Congress in which it 
had been submitted. See 18 U.S.C. S 687 (1946). 
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discretionary act by a court between a prosecutor's decision 
to drop a case and ultimate dismissal, it is adorned with 
unmistakable substantive trappings. Though this potential 
problem with Rule 48(a) is not a constitutional separation- 
of-powers problem but one of a possible violation of the 
Rules Enabling Act, it is a problem nonetheless. 
 
We need not, however, engage the full expanse of Rule 
48(a) in this case. First, as discussed above, the 
substantive reach of the rule appears to be effectively 
curtailed by the fact that even if the judge denies the 
motion to dismiss, there seems to be no way to compel the 
prosecutor to proceed. Second, this case does not present 
a facial challenge to local rule 7, which applies Rule 48(a) 
to the Territorial Court. Rather, we are reviewing the 
conduct of the Territorial Court and determining whether it 
rose to a level necessitating the extraordinary remedy of 
mandamus. We must therefore consider the viability of Rule 
48(a) within a specific factual context, which may contain 
elements that give Rule 48(a)'s application in this instance 
a procedural character because the rule was employed in 
service of substantive rights and duties that exist 
independently of the rule's text. 
 
D. 
 
Rule 48(a)'s text does not share the flaw of Rule 128(b) 
insofar as it does not set forth substantive standards that 
allow the Territorial Court to apply its judgment for what 
constitutes the public interest in contravention of the 
judgment of local prosecutors. Indeed, courts have 
generally viewed their role in granting leave to dismiss 
under 48(a) to be a limited one, because "[f]ew subjects are 
less adapted to judicial review than the exercise by the 
Executive of his discretion in deciding when and whether to 
institute criminal proceedings, or what precise charge shall 
be made or whether to dismiss a proceeding once brought." 
Newman v. United States, 382 F.2d 479, 480 (D.C. Cir. 
1967). 
 
Though this Court has not ruled on the standards that 
should be employed in determining whether a judge abuses 
his or her discretion in denying a motion under Rule 48(a), 
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other courts have opined on the subject. The Supreme 
Court has suggested that the rule exists to prevent 
harassment by prosecutors, though it has been vague on 
what other circumstances may justify its application. 
 
       While [Rule 48(a)] obviously vest[s] some discretion in 
       the court, the circumstances in which that discretion 
       may properly be exercised have not been delineated by 
       this Court. The principal object of the `leave of court' 
       requirement is apparently to protect a defendant 
       against prosecutorial harassment . . . . But the Rule 
       has also been held to permit the court to deny a 
       Government dismissal motion to which the defendant 
       has consented if the motion is prompted by 
       considerations clearly contrary to the public interest. 
 
Rinaldi v. United States, 434 U.S. 22, 29 n.15 (1977) (per 
curiam) (citations omitted). 
 
The jurisprudence in the courts of appeals has not been 
significantly clearer, save for the proposition that refusal to 
dismiss is appropriate only in the rarest of cases. As one of 
our sister courts has summarized: 
 
       Rule 48(a) is primarily intended to protect a defendant 
       from prosecutorial harassment, Rinaldi v. United 
       States, 434 U.S. 22, 31, 98 S.Ct. 81, 86, 54 L.Ed.2d 
       207 (1977) (per curiam), but it also permits courts 
       faced with dismissal motions to consider the public 
       interest in the fair administration of criminal justice 
       and the need to preserve the integrity of the courts. See 
       United States v. Hamm, 659 F.2d 624, 628-29 (5th 
       Cir.1981); United States v. Cowan, 524 F.2d 504, 512- 
       13 (5th Cir.1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 971, 96 S.Ct. 
       2168, 48 L.Ed.2d 795 (1976); cf. United States v. Derr, 
       726 F.2d 617, 619 (10th Cir.1984). A court is generally 
       required to grant a prosecutor's Rule 48(a) motion to 
       dismiss unless dismissal is `clearly contrary to 
       manifest public interest.' Cowan, 524 F.2d at 513; see 
       also [United States v.] Miller , 722 F.2d [562,] 566 [9th 
       Cir. 1983]; United States v. Salinas, 693 F.2d 348, 352 
       (5th Cir.1983); Hamm, 659 F.2d at 628. 
 
United States v. Carrigan, 778 F.2d 1454, 1463 (10th Cir. 
1985). 
 
                                22 
  
The concern of prosecutorial harassment speaks to the 
danger that a prosecutor will engage in a cycle of levying 
and dismissing charges against a particular defendant. The 
other concerns are harder to describe. Courts have equated 
a dismissal that is clearly contrary to the public interest 
with one in which the prosecutor appears motivated by 
bribery, animus towards the victim, or a desire to attend a 
social event rather than trial. See Hamm, 659 F.2d at 630. 
But Judge Swan's concerns in this case were not of an 
unfairly harassed defendant. Rather, his suspicions appear 
to have been aroused by the Government's shift in position 
as to the merits of Richards's prosecution after Richards 
switched from a public defender to private counsel. These 
suspicions were compounded by the Government's 
perceived attempt at judge-shopping.7 
 
If one adheres to the view that Rule 48(a) exists solely to 
prevent harassment of a defendant, then the Territorial 
Court may have exceeded its authority in not promptly 
dismissing the case against Richards. Indeed, several 
courts have reserved the question of whether, under Rule 
48(a), a judge may ever deny an uncontested motion to 
dismiss. See Rinaldi, 434 U.S. at 30; United States v. 
Gonzalez, 58 F.3d 459, 461 (9th Cir. 1995). We note, 
however, that when the mandamus petition was presented 
to the District Court, the Territorial Court had not denied 
the motion for dismissal. This is significant. Several courts 
have indicated that mandamus is not the proper vehicle for 
challenging a lower court's refusal to dismiss under Rule 
48(a) when the challenged court has actually issued an 
order susceptible to review through other means. For 
example, the Eighth Circuit employed the collateral order 
doctrine, rather than mandamus, to reverse a district court 
order that denied a Rule 48(a) motion to dismiss in United 
States v. Dupris, 664 F.2d 169, 172-73 (8th Cir. 1981). 
Similarly, in United States v. Cowan, 524 F.2d 504, 505 
(5th Cir. 1975), the Fifth Circuit reversed a district court 
order denying a Rule 48(a) dismissal motion on appeal and 
did not reach the question whether mandamus could be 
employed for the same purpose. This case, however, 
presents different facts from cases where review occurred 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. In chronicling these suspicions, we intimate no view on their merits. 
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on appeal. Here, Richards moved for a writ of mandamus 
before the Territorial Court issued any rulings. Judge Swan 
never actually ruled, either adversely or positively, on the 
motions to dismiss the charges against Richards. Rather, 
he merely scheduled a hearing to probe further into the 
circumstances surrounding the Government's reasons for 
seeking dismissal. 
 
The question before us under the circumstances, 
therefore, is not whether Judge Swan could properly have 
used his power under Rule 48(a) to deny a motion to 
dismiss, but whether Judge Swan's power under that rule 
was so circumscribed as to prohibit his conducting a 
hearing on the circumstances surrounding the 
Government's requested dismissal. We think that it was 
not. We conclude that even if it would have been an abuse 
of discretion on his part to ultimately deny the motion to 
dismiss, Judge Swan had discretion to hold a hearing on 
the parties' claims, especially in light of the checkered 
course of the case up to that point. See United States v. 
Salinas, 693 F.2d 348, 352 (5th Cir. 1982) ("Although the 
burden of proof is not on the prosecutor to prove that 
dismissal is in the public interest, the prosecutor is under 
an obligation to supply sufficient reasons--reasons that 
constitute more than `a mere conclusory interest.' ") 
(citation and footnote omitted); 3A Wright, Federal Practice 
& Procedure S 812 (2d ed. 1982) ("Since the court must 
exercise a sound judicial discretion in considering a request 
for dismissal, it must have factual information supporting 
the recommendation."); United States v. Greater Blouse, 
Skirt & Neckwear Contractors Assoc., Inc., 228 F. Supp. 
483, 486 (S.D.N.Y. 1964); United States v. Shanahan, 168 
F. Supp. 225, 229 (S.D. Ind. 1959); United States v. Doe, 
101 F. Supp. 609, 611 (D. Conn. 1951). Moreover, we are 
unaware of any binding precedent that a mandamus order 
can or should issue before the court has ruled on the 48(a) 
issue.8 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. That does appear to have been the procedural posture in Dawsey v. 
Gov't of the Virgin Islands, 931 F. Supp. 397 (V.I. App. Div.), aff 'd 106 
F.3d 384 (3d Cir. 1996). This Court affirmed Dawsey without opinion, 
hence that case does not bind us under our Internal Operating 
Procedures. See, e.g., United States v. Breyer, 41 F.3d 884, 892 n.11 (3d 
Cir. 1994). 
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The Government contends that Judge Swan made clear 
that he would not dismiss the matter unless he 
independently reached the conclusion that the initial 
allegations were untrue, and that he was, therefore, 
substituting his judgment for that of the prosecutor. We do 
not, however, view a judge's statements in the course of 
proceedings as a final determination of a motion. How the 
judge initially perceived the case is irrelevant to the 
question whether he had issued an appealable order. While 
Judge Swan's comments may have been premature and 
perhaps reflected an overestimation of his authority (along 
with his irritation with the Government), the facts clearly 
demonstrate that he had not ruled on the Government's 
motion when the writ of mandamus was filed. We conclude 
that a court should have the opportunity to consider and 
issue its order before a mandamus petition is filed. By 
granting first a stay of the scheduled hearing and then 
issuing a writ of mandamus, the District Court deprived 
Judge Swan of the opportunity to issue a ruling. 
 
On the facts before us, therefore, application of Rule 
48(a) does not violate the separation-of-powers system of 
the ROA. We conclude that the Territorial Court's mere 
effort to obtain information surrounding the prosecution's 
attempted dismissal of Richards's information does not 
suffice to work a substantive change in the prosecution's 
power of nolle prosequi. This conclusion is informed by the 
explanation of how Rule 48(a) can properly be used to 
justify a judge's scheduling a hearing on the motion before 
ruling, a matter to which we now turn. 
 
E. 
 
Even though a judge's discretion under Rule 48(a) is 
severely cabined, the rule may serve an important interest 
as an information- and accountability-producing vehicle. A 
judge who hears a Rule 48(a) motion has independent 
responsibilities that may bear on his or her decision on the 
requested dismissal. In other words, there are independent 
rights, interests, and duties that a court may protect, see 
Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 14 (1941), through 
using Rule 48(a) as a "sunshine" provision that exposes the 
reasons for prosecutorial decisions. 
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As discussed above, one such right is that of the 
defendant to not be harassed by repeated prosecutions that 
are dismissed before jeopardy attaches. Another interest 
that could be served by a hearing is the court's inherent 
authority to ensure that its processes are not being abused. 
Cf. Chambers v. Nasco, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 44 (1991) ("[A] 
court has the power to conduct an independent 
investigation in order to determine whether it has been the 
victim of fraud."); Eash v. Riggins Trucking, Inc., 757 F.2d 
557, 567 (3d Cir. 1985) (en banc) (discussing courts' 
inherent power to deter abuse of the judicial process 
through sanctions). In holding the hearing that he so long 
ago scheduled, Judge Swan may therefore appropriately 
inquire into whether there were any improprieties attending 
the Government's petition to dismiss the Richards's 
prosecution. 
 
Additionally, the public has a generalized interest in the 
processes through which prosecutors make decisions about 
whom to prosecute that a court can serve by inquiring into 
the reasons for a requested dismissal. See United States v. 
Cowan, 524 F.2d 504, 512-13 (5th Cir. 1975) ("We think 
[Rule 48(a)] should and can be construed to preserve the 
essential judicial function of protecting the public interest 
in the evenhanded administration of criminal justice 
without encroaching on the primary duty of the Executive 
to take care that the laws are faithfully executed."). While 
this interest cannot rise to the substantive ability to compel 
a prosecution to proceed, it does argue in favor of allowing 
a court to force prosecutors to publicly reveal their reasons 
for not proceeding before granting a requested dismissal. 
Bringing these decisions into the open may, in turn, lead to 
attempts by the public to influence these decisions through 
democratic channels. 
 
In sum, we are not prepared to rule that a judge who 
suspects wrongful behavior in the proceedings of the 
individuals before it has no power to inquire into what the 
true circumstances are. Rather, a "sunshine" rule that 
requires prosecutors to disclose the reasons for their 
actions and allows limited additional inquiry is sufficiently 
procedural that it does not run afoul of the dictates of the 
ROA. Any doubt in this regard would seem to be resolved 
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by the fact that, as discussed above, Judge Swan had no 
apparent power to force the Attorney General to proceed 
with a prosecution of Richards. 
 
For all the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the 
District Court erred in granting the writ of mandamus. 
Therefore, its order granting the writ will be reversed, with 
instructions to remand the case to the Territorial Court for 
further proceedings consistent with this opinion. The 
parties shall bear their own costs.9 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
9. Although we do not have before us the question whether mandamus 
would be appropriate if, having conducted the hearing, Judge Swan then 
refused to dismiss the charges against Richards, we must note that on 
the facts currently in the record, we strongly doubt that a refusal to 
dismiss would be justifiable. As the discussion of Rule 48(a) indicates, 
Judge Swan's ordering a hearing on the facts before him took him to the 
outer limits of his authority. Should he deny the motion on remand, or 
refuse to rule promptly one way or another, see In re Sharon Steel Corp., 
918 F.2d 434, 436-37 (3d Cir. 1990), Richards or the Government may 
then either file an interlocutory appeal or request a writ of mandamus. 
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GARTH, Circuit Judge, dissenting: 
 
The majority opinion in the instant matter has much to 
commend it, as it presents a detailed and masterful 
analysis of an extremely complex area of law. Indeed, I 
concur with the majority's conclusion (1) that the Appellate 
Division of the District Court of the Virgin Islands 
possessed the authority to issue a writ of mandamus 
against the Territorial Court of the Virgin Islands; and (2) 
that Territorial Court Rule 128(b) violates the Revised 
Organic Act (ROA). 
 
I part company with the majority opinion, however, with 
respect to its bottom line: its overly-ingenious interpretation 
that Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 48(a) is nothing 
more than a "Sunshine" provision -- a panacea that can 
provide both the courts and the general public with the 
reasons behind the United States Attorney's decision to 
dismiss pending charges against a particular defendant.1 
Contrary to the majority, in my view, Rule 48(a) is a 
substantive rule that alters the common law in order to 
allow the district courts to prevent a prosecutor from 
dismissing criminal charges without the courts' consent. 
 
As a result, Rule 48(a) cannot be imported into the rules 
of the Territorial Court through its Rule 7 because only 
procedural -- and not substantive -- rules may be 
promulgated by the Territorial Court. Accordingly, I would 
hold that the Attorney General of the Virgin Islands is 
correct in his interpretation of Rule 48(a) as a substantive 
rule and that accordingly, Richards's charge must be 
dismissed without court interference. It is for this reason 
that I respectfully dissent. 
 
I 
 
The ROA empowers "the courts established by local law" 
(i.e., the Territorial Court of the Virgin Islands) to prescribe 
their own "rules governing practice and procedure." 48 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. The majority terms Rule 48(a) "a sunshine provision that exposes the 
reasons for prosecutorial decisions," Majority Op., at 25, presumably in 
line with the Government in the Sunshine Act, 5 U.S.C. S 552b, which 
seeks to open local government meetings for citizen observation. 
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U.S.C. S 1611(c). Purporting to use this statutory provision 
as authority, the Territorial Court promulgated a rule 
patterned after Rule 48(a) -- its Rule 128(b), which states 
that 
 
       [n]o criminal case filed in the court . . . shall be 
       dismissed upon motion by any party except upon a 
       determination by the Court that the dismissal is in 
       good faith, in the public interest, and in the interest of 
       justice. 
 
The Appellate Division of the District Court of the Virgin 
Islands held this rule to be void. See In re Richards, 52 F. 
Supp. 2d 522, 528-29 (D.V.I. 1999). That court also held 
that Rule 48(a), which states that 
 
       the United States attorney may by leave of courtfile a 
       dismissal of an indictment, information or complaint 
       and the prosecution shall thereupon terminate, 
 
could not be applied in the Territorial Courts of the Virgin 
Islands, notwithstanding the effect of Territorial Court Rule 
7.2 Id. at 529-30. The Appellate Division premised this 
holding on the fact that, pursuant to the ROA, any rule 
promulgated or adopted by the Territorial Court, including 
Rule 7, must be procedural, and not substantive, in nature. 
See id. at 528-30. The majority in the instant case, as 
opposed to my view, holds that Rule 48(a) is not a 
substantive rule, although it admits that the rule"is 
adorned with unmistakable substantive trappings." Majority 
Op., at 21. In my opinion, there is no difference between 
Rule 128(b), which even the majority rejects as being in 
violation of the ROA, and Rule 48(a). The contents of both 
rules are substantively identical and obviously, therefore, if 
one rule is ineffective to condition a prosecutor's 
recommendation of dismissal, then so too is the other. 
Hence, my position in this regard is straight-forward and 
rather simple: neither Rule 128(b) nor Rule 48(a) is effective 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. Territorial Court Rule 7 provides that "[t]he practice and procedure in 
the Territorial Court shall be governed by the Rules of the Territorial 
Court and, to the extent not inconsistent therewith, by the Rules of the 
District Court, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the Federal Rules of 
Criminal Procedure and the Federal Rules of Evidence." Terr. Ct. R. 7. 
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in the courts of the Virgin Islands because both  are 
substantive rules. 
 
A 
 
The difference between rules that are "substantive" and 
cannot be promulgated or adopted in the Virgin Islands and 
those that merely regulate "practice and procedure" must 
initially be explored. The starting point for this inquiry 
must be the Supreme Court's watershed decision in 
Sibbach & Co. v. Wilson, 312 U.S. 1 (1941). 3 In Sibbach, the 
Court held that "the test must be whether a rule really 
regulates procedure[ ] -- the judicial process for enforcing 
rights and duties recognized by substantive law and for 
justly administering remedy and redress for disregard or 
infraction of them." Id. at 14. 
 
As numerous commentators have indicated, however, the 
Sibbach test alone is of little help in determining whether a 
given rule is procedural or substantive in nature. See 
Wright, Miller & Cooper, Federal Practice & Procedure: 
Jurisdiction, S 4509, at 264 (stating that the Sibbach 
formula "is no test at all -- in a sense, it is little more than 
the statement that a matter is procedural if, by revelation, 
it is procedural"). As a result, in order to derive a proper 
standard to delineate between procedure and substance, 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. I acknowledge that Sibbach and its progeny concern not the ROA, but 
the Rules Enabling Act (REA), presently codified at 28 U.S.C. S 2072. The 
REA, quite similar to the ROA, authorizes the Supreme Court of the 
United States to promulgate rules of practice and procedure for use in 
the federal courts, so long as such rules do not impair the substantive 
rights of any litigant. See 28 U.S.C. S 2072. Although the REA is not 
directly implicated in the instant matter, resort to the jurisprudence 
emanating from the REA is necessary because of the lack of interpretive 
guidance concerning the virtually identical provisions of the ROA. 
Indeed, the majority implicitly recognizes such. Majority Op., at 19 n.5. 
 
Both the majority and I hold that the Supreme Court cannot 
promulgate substantive rules under the REA. Even though neither party 
to the present appeal has raised the specific issue of whether Rule 48(a) 
violates the REA's provisions because it is substantive and not 
procedural, I suggest that the propriety of Rule 48(a) with respect to all 
federal courts be re-examined. 
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something must be added to the Sibbach Court's analysis. 
Hart and Wechsler, the oft-cited civil procedure scholars, 
have opined that substantive rules are those that 
"characteristically and reasonably affect people's conduct at 
the stage of primary private activity." Hart & Wechsler, The 
Federal Courts & the Federal System 678 (1953); see also 
Paul D. Carrington, "Substance" and "Procedure" in the 
Rules Enabling Act, 1989 Duke L.J. 281. With this 
understanding of the procedure vs. substance "dichotomy," 
I am satisfied that both Rule 128(b) and Rule 48(a) are 
substantive rules, and therefore violate the provisions of the 
ROA. 
 
B 
 
As the majority acknowledges, both Rule 128(b) and Rule 
48(a) implicate decisions that the common law exclusively 
granted (and still grants, in many jurisdictions) to the 
prosecutor -- decisions regarding whether to dismiss 
pending criminal charges against a particular defendant. 
This prosecutorial right, known as nolle prosequi, was 
absolute at common law -- no entity, including the 
judiciary, could challenge the prosecutor's decision to end 
a criminal proceeding. See Confiscation Cases , 74 U.S. (7 
Wall.) 454, 457 (1868) ("Under the rules of the common law 
it must be conceded that the prosecuting party may 
relinquish his suit at any stage of it, and withdraw from 
court at his option . . . ."); 3 Charles E. Torcia, Wharton's 
Criminal Procedure S 445, at 926 (13th ed. 1991). 
Notwithstanding this common law principle, both Rule 
128(b) and Rule 48(a) restrict a prosecutor's right to 
dismiss criminal charges. 
 
The nolle prosequi tradition goes to the very heart of the 
prosecutorial role and function. As such, any  restriction on 
the prosecutor's right of nolle prosequi would necessarily 
enter the substantive arena, and thus not be available for 
regulation by the Territorial Court. Given that such 
interference with a prosecutor's discretion "transfers 
discretion that was once wielded by the local prosecutor 
into judicial hands," Majority Op., at 17-18 (emphasis 
added), it is obvious that both rules must be deemed 
substantive. 
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The majority, which holds that Rule 128(b) is 
substantive, but that Rule 48(a), despite its "substantive 
trappings," Majority Op., at 21, is not, gives an 
unwarranted life to Rule 48(a) in the Virgin Islands. It does 
so by grafting onto Rule 48(a)'s substantive provisions a 
"Sunshine" gloss that runs counter to Rule 48(a)'s history 
and that nowhere appears in Rule 48(a)'s jurisprudence. It 
is not surprising, therefore, that I find the Appellate 
Division's analysis persuasive in finding that Rule 48(a) 
cannot be applied in the Virgin Islands. 
 
i. 
 
The majority first attempts to justify its inconsistency in 
characterizing identical rules differently by explaining that 
Rule 128(b), unlike Rule 48(a), contains specific standards. 
See Majority Op., at 23-24. Those standard s (i.e., good 
faith, public interest, and the interest of justice) inform a 
judge's decision whether to grant a prosecutor's motion to 
dismiss pending charges. Terming such principles 
"substantive standards," the majority reasons that Rule 
48(a)'s lack of such standards is an indication that the 
courts' "role in granting leave to dismiss under 48(a) [is] a 
limited one," Id. at 21, and as such, does not wrongfully 
venture beyond the procedural domain. 
 
Building upon this purported lack of standards, the 
majority then fashions its own interpretation of Rule 48(a) 
-- the "Sunshine" principle to which I alluded earlier. More 
specifically, the majority opines that Rule 48(a)"ensures 
that [the courts'] processes are not being abused," and 
allows the public to gain an insight into "the processes 
through which prosecutors make decisions about whom to 
prosecute." Id. at 26. 
 
As an initial matter, although the majority is correct that 
the express terms of Rule 48(a) do not indicate that a 
judge's decision to grant or deny a prosecutorial motion to 
dismiss pending criminal charges are subject to the 
standards of good faith, public interest and the interest of 
justice, those courts that have sought to interpret Rule 
48(a) have imputed those standards to the rule itself. The 
lone Supreme Court discussion of Rule 48(a), United States 
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v. Rinaldi, 434 U.S. 22 (1977) (per curiam), states that Rule 
48(a) was primarily intended to protect against 
prosecutorial harassment, but that a court would likely be 
within its discretion in rejecting a Rule 48(a) motion where 
dismissal was not in the public interest. See id. at 29 n.15. 
Picking up on this theme, the Fourth Circuit in United 
States v. Smith, 55 F.3d 157 (4th Cir. 1995), held that "the 
disposition of a government's motion to dismiss an 
indictment should be decided by determining whether the 
prosecutor acted in good faith at the time he moved for 
dismissal." Id. at 159. The Smith court cited a "prosecutor's 
acceptance of a bribe, personal dislike of the victim, and 
dissatisfaction with the jury impaneled" as examples of 
prosecutorial misconduct that would warrant denial of a 
Rule 48(a) motion. See id. 
 
Perhaps the most extensive treatment of Rule 48(a) can 
be found in the Fifth Circuit's opinion in United States v. 
Cowen, 524 F.2d 504 (5th Cir. 1975). In Cowen, the court 
held that Rule 48(a) was a "manifest" attempt on the part 
of the Supreme Court to vest "in the courts the power and 
the duty to exercise a discretion for the protection of the 
public interest." Id. at 511. Although the Fifth Circuit 
believed that such discretion was extremely limited, in that 
the prosecutorial decision "should not be judicially 
disturbed unless clearly contrary to the public interest," 
Rule 48(a), in its view, did provide for "a discretion broad 
enough to protect the public interest in the fair 
administration of justice." Id. at 512. 
 
As such, each of the so-called "substantive standards" 
identified by the majority as contained within Rule 128(b) 
and ostensibly missing from the provisions of Rule 48(a) 
have been considered part and parcel of Rule 48(a)'s"leave 
of court" requirement. Rule 48(a) thus vests the district 
judge with decisionmaking power as to whether pending 
criminal charges against a defendant should be dismissed 
pursuant to the standards noted above -- specific 
standards that prior to the promulgation of Rule 48(a) were 
weighed solely within the province of the prosecutor 
himself. 
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ii. 
 
The majority's self-avowed purpose that it attributes to 
Rule 48(a) -- to air the rationale(s) behind the sought-for 
dismissal of a criminal proceeding -- suffers from serious 
flaws. See Majority Op., at 25-27. First, such an 
interpretation is belied by the very history behind the 
Supreme Court's promulgation of the rule. According to the 
late Professor Lester Orfield,4 the Advisory Committee's 
proposed version of what now appears as Rule 48(a) did not 
contain the phrase "with leave of court" that presently 
appears in the rule. Rather, the original rule provided that 
in order to obtain a dismissal of pending criminal charges, 
a prosecutor would be required to provide the district court 
"with a statement of the reasons therefor." See Mark S. 
Rhodes, Orfield's Criminal Procedure Under the Federal 
Rules S 48:11, at 251 (2d ed. 1987); see also 4 Drafting 
History of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure  178 
(Madeline J. Wilken & Nicholas Triffen, eds.) (1991) 
(reprinting the original version of Rule 48(a) that the 
Advisory Committee transmitted to the Supreme Court). 
Before the Supreme Court promulgated Rule 48(a) in its 
present form, however, it deleted the requirement for a 
"statement of the reasons therefor," and replaced that 
phrase with the language currently found in the rule-- 
"with leave of court." Id.; see also United States v. Hamm, 
659 F.2d 624, 631 n.23 (5th Cir. Unit A 1981) (stating that 
the initial version of Rule 48(a) drew sharp criticism from 
prosecutors, and therefore was modified to its present 
form). 
 
If Rule 48(a)'s language had remained unchanged from 
its original Advisory Committee format, the majority would 
have more license for its "Sunshine" interpretation of the 
rule. The fact that the Supreme Court eliminated  express 
language that would support this "Sunshine" purpose for 
Rule 48(a), however, is fatal to the majority's creative 
attempt to distinguish or differentiate between Rule 48(a) 
and Rule 128(b). Indeed, as Professor Orfield wrote, "a 
dismissal [of prosecution] might [now] be filed without any 
statement of reasons." Id. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. Orfield was a member of the Original Advisory Committee to the 
Supreme Court with respect to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. 
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The majority therefore is plainly incorrect is its novel 
assertion that the Supreme Court intended Rule 48(a) as a 
"Sunshine" rule in order to assist the court system and the 
public to understand a prosecutor's reasons for seeking a 
dismissal of a criminal proceeding. It inexorably follows 
that because Rule 128(b) and Rule 48(a) are spun from an 
identical cloth, if Rule 128(b) is void because it is 
substantive, then so too is Rule 48(a). 
 
C 
 
Moreover, I also believe that the majority's "Sunshine" 
interpretation of Rule 48(a) is not as innocuous as my 
colleagues may in fact believe. The majority claims that "the 
substantive reach of the rule [48(a)] appears to be 
effectively curtailed" because the court cannot compel a 
prosecutor to proceed if the motion to dismiss were denied. 
Majority Op., at 21. Indeed, the majority states that 
interpreting Rule 48(a) as a "Sunshine" rule"is sufficiently 
procedural that it does not run afoul of the dictates of the 
ROA," and that "[a]ny doubt in this regard would seem to 
be resolved by the fact that . . . Judge Swan had no 
apparent power to force the Attorney General to proceed 
with a prosecution." Id. at 36. I believe that the majority's 
theoretical analysis misses a crucial point with respect to 
the procedure/substance dichotomy. 
 
As stated above, the very essence of the common law 
right of nolle prosequi was that the prosecutor enjoyed 
absolute control over the course of a specific prosecution. 
Although most of the preceding discussion is framed in 
terms of the ultimate decision as to whether to prosecute a 
particular offender at all, included within this broad power 
are a multitude of prosecutorial decisions bearing on the 
institution and maintenance of criminal proceedings. As an 
example, once a prosecutor is confronted with alleged 
wrongdoing on the part of a purported defendant, the 
prosecutor must determine under which statute(s) to seek 
criminal sanctions, and the proper evidence to introduce in 
order to obtain a conviction. Because the majority's 
"Sunshine" interpretation severely impacts on such 
decisions -- those that go to the very core of the 
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prosecutorial function -- Rule 48(a) has a much more 
significant reach than the majority envisages. 
 
The facts of the instant matter demonstrate this problem. 
The Government of the Virgin Islands initially filed -- via an 
information -- a felony rape charge against Richards in the 
Territorial Court, and then amended that information to 
include a misdemeanor charge. The Government thereafter 
agreed to allow Richards to plead guilty to the misdemeanor 
charge in return for dismissal of the felony charge. Judge 
Swan refused to allow the Government to dismiss the felony 
charge. After this initial refusal, however, Judge Swan 
scheduled a hearing to determine whether such a dismissal 
was consistent with the "public interest." 
 
This "public interest" hearing would have been no 
different from the novel "Sunshine" hearing now advocated 
by the majority. Indeed, because of the prospect of such a 
hearing, the Government disclosed that it sought a 
dismissal of the felony charges because the evidence did 
not support a felony conviction. The government also 
claimed that the primary witnesses against Richards (the 
alleged victim and her mother) would not testify. With this 
information revealed, it would surprise me if Richards were 
to continue to plead guilty to the misdemeanor charge, 
particularly because he now has been informed that the 
two main witnesses who could implicate him will not 
provide any assistance to the Government in its 
prosecution. 
 
As a result, Judge Swan's "public interest" hearing, much 
like the "Sunshine" hearing the majority now urges upon 
us, essentially forced the Government to play out its hand 
and disclose information that it normally would seek to 
keep confidential.5 Indeed, the simple knowledge on the 
part of the prosecutor that such a hearing would be held if 
he were to seek dismissal of a defendant's charges could 
not help but impact the manner by which the prosecutor 
would conduct the course of the criminal litigation. In other 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. I, of course, am not suggesting that a prosecutor would be entitled to 
keep exculpatory evidence from disclosure. See, e.g., Brady v. Maryland, 
373 U.S. 83 (1963). 
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words, the allegedly innocuous "Sunshine" hearing could 
irreparably impair day-to-day prosecutorial decisionmaking. 
 
The ability to hold such a hearing under the auspices of 
Rule 48(a) therefore provides a district court judge with the 
opportunity to commandeer the entire prosecutorial process 
-- a process that the common law provided to the 
prosecutor exclusively through the nolle prosequi doctrine. 
Given that such consequences reach far beyond the 
courtroom and intrusively into each and every prosecutorial 
decision, I do not understand how the majority's 
"Sunshine" interpretation of Rule 48(a) can be deemed 
either harmless or procedural. 
 
II 
 
I have gone to great lengths to point out that in an effort 
to save Rule 48(a) from a substantive characterization, the 
majority not only errs, but is inconsistent in its analysis of 
two identical rules -- Rule 128(b) of the Territorial Court of 
the Virgin Islands and Rule 48(a) of the Federal Rules of 
Criminal Procedure. The majority cannot hold one rule void 
and still uphold the other. I can understand the majority's 
desire to have Rule 48(a) provide for a district court's 
oversight of a prosecutor's decision to dismiss pending 
criminal charges. When the adoption of this rule goes 
beyond the authority that Congress has given to the 
Territorial Court of the Virgin Islands, however, it is neither 
appropriate nor wise to finesse its adoption by a subterfuge 
such as the seemingly benign "Sunshine" gloss that the 
majority has imparted to Rule 48(a). 
 
The Appellate Division of the District Court of the Virgin 
Islands was quite correct in its analysis and in its issuance 
of a writ of mandamus. Because logic, precedent, history, 
and reason compel such a result, I would affirm that 
decision. In doing so, I must respectfully dissent. 
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